Joschka Fischer
Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005, a term marked by Germany's strong support for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, followed by its opposition to th…Full profile
CommentsFortunately,
war between world powers is no longer a realistic option, owing to the
threat of mutual nuclear destruction. But major international crises,
such as the current global financial crisis, remain with us – which
might not be an entirely bad thing.
CommentsJust as in war, crises fundamentally disrupt the status quo,
which means that they create an opportunity – without war’s destructive
force – for change that in normal times is hardly possible. To overcome
a crisis requires doing things that previously were barely conceivable,
let alone feasible.
CommentsThat
is what has happened to the European Union over the last three years,
because the global financial crisis has not only shaken Europe to its
foundations; it has assumed life-threatening proportions.
CommentsCompared
to the beginning of 2009, we are now dealing with a significantly
different EU – one that has become divided between a vanguard of member
states that form the eurozone and a rearguard, consisting of member
states that remain outside it. The reason is not evil intent, but rather
the pressure of the crisis. If the euro is to survive, eurozone members
must act, while other EU members with various levels of commitment to
European integration remain on the fringe.
CommentsIndeed,
almost all taboos that existed after the eruption of the crisis have
now been abolished. Most were established at German instigation, but now
they have been removed with the German government’s active support.
CommentsIt
is an impressive list: national responsibility for bank rescues; the
sanctity of the EU treaty’s proscription of bailouts for governments;
rejection of European economic governance; the ban on direct government
financing by the European Central Bank; refusal to support mutual
liability for debt; and, finally, the transformation of the ECB from a
copy of the old Bundesbank into a European Federal Reserve Bank based on
the Anglo-Saxon model.
CommentsWhat
remains is the rejection of Eurobonds, but that, too, will ultimately
disappear. The only question is whether that taboo will fall before or
after next year’s German general election. The answer depends on the
future course of the crisis.
CommentsGermany,
Europe’s largest economy, is playing a strange, sometimes bizarre, role
in the crisis. At no point since the founding of the Federal Republic
in 1949 has the country been so strong. It has become the EU’s leading
power; but it is neither willing nor able to lead.
CommentsPrecisely
for this reason, many of the changes in Europe have occurred despite
German opposition. In the end, the German government has had to resort
to the art of the political U-turn, with the result that Germany, though
economically strong, has grown institutionally weaker – a dynamic
exemplified by its reduced influence in the ECB’s Governing Council.
CommentsThe
old Bundesbank was laid to rest on September 6, when the ECB adopted
its “outright monetary transactions” program – unlimited purchases of
distressed eurozone countries’ government bonds – over the objections of
a lone dissenter: Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann. And the
undertaker was not ECB President Mario Draghi; it was German Chancellor
Angela Merkel.
CommentsThe
Bundesbank did not fall victim to a sinister southern European
conspiracy; rather, it rendered itself irrelevant. Had it gotten its
way, the eurozone would no longer exist. Placing ideology above
pragmatism is a formula for failure in any crisis.
CommentsCurrently,
the eurozone is on the threshold of a banking union, with a fiscal
union to follow. But, even with only a banking union, the pressure
toward political union will grow.
CommentsWith
27 members (28 with the approaching addition of Croatia), EU treaty
amendments will be impossible, not only because the United Kingdom
continues to resist further European integration, but also because
popular referenda would be required in many member states. These
plebiscites would become a reckoning for national governments on their
crisis policies, which no sound-minded government will want.
CommentsThis
means that intergovernmental agreements will be needed for some time to
come, and that the eurozone will develop in the direction of inter-governmental federalism. This promises to be exciting, as it will offer completely unexpected possibilities for political integration.
CommentsIn the end, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has prevailed, because the eurozone today is led by a de facto
economic government that comprises member countries’ heads of state and
government (and their finance ministers). European federalists should
welcome this, because the more these heads of state and government turn
into a government of the eurozone as a whole, the faster their current
dual role as the EU’s executive and legislative branch will become
obsolete.
CommentsThe
European Parliament will not be able to fill the emerging vacuum, as it
lacks fiscal sovereignty, which still lies with national parliaments
and will remain there indefinitely. Only national parliaments can fill
the vacuum, and they need a common platform within the eurozone – a kind
of “Euro Chamber” – through which they can control European economic
governance.
CommentsFederalists
in the European Parliament, and in Brussels generally, should not feel
threatened. On the contrary, they should recognize and use this unique
opportunity. National MPs and MEPs should come together quickly and
clarify their relationship. In the medium term, a European Parliament
with two chambers could emerge.
CommentsThis
crisis offers a tremendous opportunity for Europe. It has defined the
agenda for years to come: banking union, fiscal union, and political
union. What remains missing is an economic-growth strategy for the
crisis countries; but, given mounting unrest in southern Europe, such a
strategy is inevitable. Europeans have reason to be optimistic if they
recognize the opportunity that their crisis has created – and act boldly
and decisively to seize it.
